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INTRODUCTION 
The period from the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003 to resumption 
of Space Shuttle flights, planned for May 2005, has presented significant challenges to 
International Space Station (ISS) maintenance operations. Sharply curtailed upmass 
capability has forced NASA to revise its support strategy and to undertake maintenance 
activities that have significantly expanded the envelope of the ISS maintenance concept. 
This experience has enhanced confidence in the ability to continue to support ISS in the 
period following the permanent retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet in 2010. Even 
greater challenges face NASA with the implementation of the Vision for Space 
Exploration that will introduce extended missions to the Moon beginning in the period of 
2015 - 2020 and ultimately see human missions to more distant destinations such as 
Mars. The experience and capabilities acquired through meeting the maintenance 
challenges of ISS will serve as the foundation for the maintenance strategy that will be 
employed in support of these future missions. 
Iss CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
The planned retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet in 2010, part of the Vision for Space 
Exploration announced by President Bush in February 2004, has driven reconsideration 
of supply support plans and fundamental approaches to on-orbit maintenance. The hiatus 
in Shuttle flights beginning in February 2003 and extending to May 2005 sharply limited 
the amount of spares and equipment that could be shipped to orbit during this period. 
Prior to the announcement of the Space Shuttle retirement, the logistics and maintenance 
support strategy centered on removal and replacement of failed orbital replaceable units 
(ORUs), return of the failed ORUs to Earth for repair and refurbishment, and subsequent 
re-launch as required. After the Shuttle retires, the expendable launch vehicles available 
to launch upmass include the Japanese HI1 Transfer Vehicle (HTV), the European 
Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), and the Russian Progress vehicle. The expected 
yearly flight rate will be two flights per year for the HTV, one ATV flight per year; and 
several Progress flights per year. None of these carriers provide the capability to return 
hardware to Earth. Therefore, from 2011 until the conclusion of NASA’s planned 
participation in the ISS program in 2016, hardware flow will be in one direction only and 
no hardware will be returned for refurbishment and later use. Additionally, the only 
carrier that can carry external, unpressurized hardware is the HTV - although because of 
volumetric constraints its capability to do so is less than that of the Shuttle. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060055234 2019-08-30T00:11:03+00:00Z
Because of the limitations on launching external, unpressurized cargo (especially very 
large items) after 2010, an effort will be made to preposition as much external hardware 
as possible at ISS before Shuttle retirement. The first logistics and maintenance external 
launch allocation occurs in February 2009. This will be followed by two dedicated 
unpressurized maintenance flights in 2010. In addition to making available items that 
cannot be launched later, prepositioning decreases response time to failures, increases the 
functionality of the ISS, and decreases the total external launch demand on HTV 
following Shuttle retirement. Despite this plan for prepositioning it is expected that by 
2014 the external spares inventory may be fully expended and, therefore, no external 
maintenance could be performed after that point. This situation may improve somewhat 
if early failures of equipment deployed during the remainder of the assembly process are 
less than expected. 
Internal maintenance is faced with different, but equally significant, challenges. Since 
the ATV, HTV, and Progress vehicles cannot return failed hardware to Earth for 
refurbishment, the ISS program will have a finite number of spares available. Because of 
economic factors, spares production lines cannot be kept open indefinitely for very 
limited production volume. Once production of spares is terminated, the ISS will be 
dependant on the spares available at that time and, when those have been used, no more 
will be available. 
For this reason, expansion of maintenance and repair capabilities that allow the 
preservation of spares is highly attractive. Experience acquired during the recent Shuttle 
stand-down has shown that it is possible to perform maintenance that was previously not 
considered. For example, a pump was changed in one of the Extravehicular Mobility 
Units (i.e. spacesuits) upper torso assembly. This task would have normally been 
addressed by exchange of the complete upper torso. In the case of a failed bearing in the 
gyro unit of the Treadmill Vibration Isolation System, individual roller bearings were 
replaced rather than removal and replacement of the entire gyro unit. In both cases, the 
amount of time required for the more in-depth repairs was significantly greater than that 
which would have been required for the originally planned repair approach. These 
experiences demonstrate that maintenance actions can be performed that were previously 
considered to be beyond the capabilities of ISS astronaut crews. However, they also 
illustrate that unless systems are designed for maintenance, the time required can be 
excessive. 
In summary, the new strategy for ISS maintenance - driven by reduced upmass capacity 
following Shuttle retirement and unidirectional cargo flow - is to preposition as much as 
possible with the Shuttle while it is still available and to perform more repair on-orbit. 
Maintenance actions undertaken during the recent Shuttle stand down have enhanced 
confidence in our ability to perform more aggressive repairs on-orbit. This experience 
has stimulated consideration of ways to fitrther expand the maintenance capability 
envelope and to make these types of repairs more standard. 
Missions contemplated as part of the Vision for Space Exploration are characterized by 
great distances from Earth, widely spaced launch opportunities, and extended duration. 
For example, some missions to Mars could last as long as three years. Opportunities to 
launch payloads to Mars from Earth occur at intervals of approximately twenty-six 
months because of planetary alignment and, in the extreme, round-trip communication 
time can be as much as forty minutes. Thus, all equipment and components that the 
astronaut crews will need to support a mission to Mars must be launched with them or be 
prepositioned for them on the planet’s surface as much as two years in advance of their 
arrival. Because of the extended communications time, they cannot rely on constant real- 
time interaction with support personnel on Earth to help them with maintenance and 
repair tasks and must be able to work autonomously. 
The necessity to minimize the mass of equipment launched towards Mars, while 
providing everything required to support a three-year mission, suggests that it will be 
important to perform maintenance at the lowest hardware levels where the replacement 
components are smallest. This further implies a need for extensive commonality of 
components across systems and vehicles to reduce the total number of distinct parts. The 
recent repairs performed onboard the ISS, described above, have helped to build 
confidence that performing repairs at this level is feasible. The ability to do so 
extensively will be enhanced if this approach is embraced from the beginning of design 
so that enabling features are incorporated. 
Because of the need for autonomous operations, all information required to perform 
maintenance at the expected levels must be carried onboard the spacecraft. Enhanced 
methods must be available to allow the crew to effectively utilize this information. For 
example, it will probably be impractical to develop all possible maintenance procedures 
in advance of a mission so the availability of intelligent systems that can develop a 
maintenance procedure based on failure signatures and onboard system design 
information would be highly desirable. 
SUMMARY 
Challenges we have recently faced and new strategies developed in response to the 
impending retirement of the Space Shuttle have provided an opportunity for growth and 
expapsion of the in-space maintenance capability envelope. These new capabilities are 
very similar to those that will be required to enable future human exploration missions to 
Mars and beyond. Continuing operation of the International Space Station provides an 
opportunity to further enhance the maintenance and repair capabilities that will be 
necessary to allow humans to continue the exploration of space beyond the immediate 
vicinity of Earth. 
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